behind the funding of the opposition political parties and various civic groups in order to effect regime change.
The unfolding of the above events led government to adopt a hostile view of civil society groups, Britain and its western allies, as well as opposition political parties, especially the MDC. The pretext for the attempt to bring civil societies into the sphere of the state is often given as their inept financial mismanagement, their lack of control of their funds. 19 But the reality behind the attempts is the government's fear of the potential NGOs have for organising people outside state structures, and also the change in donor policies, which now emphasise the building of the institutions of civil society, so that NGOs now receive funds which earlier would have gone to government projects. 20 Thus civil society can be seen to be in direct competition with government over donor funds 21 . New legislation and the amendment of existing laws reflects vindictiveness on the part of government towards NGOs, for the laws are now geared at restricting citizens' participation in governance and policy 17 Keulder State, Society and Democracy 17. .
The Constitution of Zimbabwe (1979)
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. All national legislation emanates from and should conform to it. 23 Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003) note that "...the formal constitution of the state should in principle provide the ultimate legal framework through which rational-legal behaviour is defined and is not to be used as a punitive measure against citizens." 24 However "constitutions lay down the overall nature and the characteristics of political institutions in elaborate detail, and hold promises of institutionally guaranteed civil liberties and political democracy".
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Constitutional provisions include civil and political rights, which all citizens are entitled to, irrespective of religion, colour or political affiliation. 26 Through registering and allowing the institutions of civil society a continued existence, the state is creating an avenue for civil participation in national programmes that help in realising societal objectives such as poverty alleviation, the observance of human rights, the [Chapter 20:10] , and which is itemised in Schedule 7, being agricultural land required for resettlement purposes. 30 Public Order and Security Act 2002, seeking to curtail civil liberties and the freedoms of movement, expression and assembly, eg Part II regards the following as offences against constitutional government and public security: causing disaffection among members of the Police Force or Defence Force (s 12); publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the State (s 15); undermining the authority of or insulting the President (s 16). Part III regards the following as offences against public order: gatherings conducive to riot, disorder or intolerance (s. 19); assaulting or resisting a police officer (s. 20); undermining police authority (s. 21); intimidation (s. 22). Part IV sets the procedure that needs to be followed in order to be allowed to have a public gathering: organisers are to notify the regulating authority of their intention to hold a public gathering (s. 24); regulation of public gatherings (s. 25); prohibition of public gatherings to avoid public disorder (s. 26); temporary prohibition of the holding of public demonstrations within particular police districts (s. 27); civil liability in certain circumstances of organiser of public gathering (s. 
Urban Councils Act (1996)
The World Bank (2007:195) argues that "local government has the power to manage its own fiscal revenues and expenditures, subject to national framework conditions."
On the effectiveness of local government institutions, it suggests that local government institutions are "a desired and natural outgrowth of trends towards fiscal should be "used as a guide to measure progress in promoting administrative autonomy, fiscal autonomy, public property rights and decentralization of services".
37
The attainment of political independence in Zimbabwe in 1980 brought with it a number of local government constitutional reforms. Through the amendment to the Urban Councils Act (1973) in 1996, Chapter 214 of the Act was effected, which provided for the decentralisation and democratisation of the Local Government system by removing racial discrimination pertaining to representation and tenure in urban areas. 38 The Urban Councils Act of 1973 had provided for local authorities based on racial lines and was highly centralised. The resultant amendment to the Act led to the incorporation of former local government areas (African townships) into Urban Council areas. 39 The democratisation of the Urban Councils also resulted in the enfranchisement of rent-paying lodgers, who did not have the vote under the colonial Local Government system. 40 The decentralisation of the decision-making processes from central government to urban councils resulted in increased public participation in policy formulation and development. 41 However it has been noted that "the policy formulation process in Zimbabwe is largely top-down in nature, thereby rendering citizen participation in the process a reaction to policy proposals from the top". 42 The top-down approach practised by some governments has been defended by the statement that "government officials are the ones who have the information on what resources the central government will make available for the implementation of development programmes and projects, so they are justified to make critical decisions regarding these programmes and projects if they are to be funded".
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However, the democratisation of urban councils has been frustrated by "the relatively stronger hand from central government which gives the Minister of Local This is an enabling Act of Parliament, which empowers ratepayers in urban areas to form residents' associations that would represent ratepayers' interests. These can even summon political leadership to address ratepayers on issues affecting them, such as the unwarranted hiking of rates, as well as poor service delivery. 45 The
Urban Councils' Act facilitates citizens' participation in the affairs of urban councils through involving ratepayers in such civic matters as the design and implementation of the budget process. However, through the Act government retains much of the decision-making power. Part 4 of POSA, entitled "Public Gathering" is most commonly used against opposition campaign meetings, including the activities of civil society bodies.
Sections 24-31 lay down conditions for the holding of public gatherings. Under section 24 anyone who wishes to organise a public gathering must notify the police four days in advance. Under section 25 the police are authorised to place restrictions on the gathering or prohibit it entirely as stipulated under section 26 if they have "reasonable grounds for believing" the gathering will result in public disorder, a breach of the peace, or obstruction of any thoroughfare. These provisions are regularly misunderstood or deliberately misapplied by the police. The organisers of a gathering are required to "notify" the police; the section does not state that the police must "give permission". Having been notified the police then have the power to prohibit the event, but only on the specified grounds. If no prohibition is made by the responsible authority, then the law is that the gathering is not prohibited and may proceed. 69 The excuses given by the police for prohibiting gatherings are entirely flimsy. They have even been known to claim that the responsible authority is not available. Other reasons have been that ZANU PF has booked the same venue, or that the gathering is likely to provoke disorder. Where disorder has been caused on a previous occasion by ZANU PF militias, trumped-up charges are laid against other political parties, especially the MDC. The other sections of Part IV provide for general prohibitions on all gatherings in a specific district, for the civil liability of the organiser of gatherings for any damage caused, the dispersal of unlawful gatherings, and the prohibition of the carrying of weapons at gatherings, which by definition includes "any stone". In practice it is not surprising that ZANU PF gatherings are virtually never prohibited while others are regularly blocked. 70 Ironically the numbers required to constitute a public gathering are nowhere specified, which leaves the police with the leeway to manipulate the law, with many people and organisations transposing the "two or more persons" mentioned in sections 17 and 19 to apply to public gatherings. Furthermore, a schedule to the Act exempts a list of "classes of public gathering to which section 24 does not apply". Those exempted from the obligation to notify the police include organisers of religious, educational or sporting events, weddings, funerals, and professional meetings, as well as gatherings of organisations "not of a political nature" and specifically, "registered trade unions when meeting for bona fide trade union purposes".
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Cumulatively these sections (17-24) 72 have been used to decline or shut down several public meetings, including those held by elected MDC officials to report to their constituencies. The police are not required to give reasons why meetings are considered threats to public order nor do they suggest conditions under which the meetings could be held, a recent example being the abortive campaign rally of the MDC which was denied by the partisan police on the pretext that the same venue had been booked by ZANU PF. 73 Upon further inquiry it was discovered that ZANU PF neither held nor had booked the venue. 74 The Act gives the police arbitrary powers such as the authority to change the venue or other logistical aspects of a meeting, prohibit the meeting entirely, or prohibit all public meetings in a particular police district for up to three months. In practice the police do not sanction any meeting presumed to threaten public order, the organisers being referred to Section 19, which discourages "gatherings conducive to riot, disorder or intolerance". Section 32 of POSA empowers the police to cordon off areas and search individuals and residences, to stop people in public places at random, to search them and to demand the production of identity documents. 79 Magaisa (2003) concludes that the decision marks a dangerous precedent in human rights jurisprudence in Zimbabwe.
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Countries "which are committed to democratic good governance should adopt a legal regime that promotes access to information". 81 Access to information is "the ability of the citizen to obtain information in the possession of the state." 82 AIPPA is a legal instrument that enables the government to monitor and control the flow of information in the country. In enacting the legislation, the government argued that it wanted to prevent the publication of information that is "manufactured and can be manipulated into a lethal weapon for our downfall". 83 Under sections 38, 39 and 42 the Act prohibits the publication of unverified stories and is empowered to register and deregister journalists or deny them a licence to practise without giving reasons. 
The Broadcast Services Act (BSA) (2000)
The world over, countries that are called democracies insist on the independence of the media, both in principle and in practice.  section 6, providing that the Minister, and not BAZ, should be the final licensing authority;  section 9(1), limiting to one the number of national free-to-air broadcasting services for each of radio and television;  section 9(2), providing that only one signal carrier licence could be issued; and  section 9(3), providing that only a public broadcaster could hold both a broadcasting and a signal carrier licence.
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Until the judgment in the Capital Radio case it was a criminal offence for any person to broadcast both radio and television signals. 103 It is rather ironic that the same government that ascended to power in part due to the influence of the media should be seen denying opposition political parties slots to campaign on radio and television.
The constitution of the administration of the broadcasting authority is such that it shows the desire of the government to control the dissemination of information. Sections 8(1)(2)(5) Additionally, sections 8(1)(2)(5), and 22(2) stipulate that a licence will be issued only to citizens ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe, which limits ownership to locals or residents. Also that no one should own more than 10% of the station. The licensing period is too short and according to Section 12(2) and (3) of the ZBSA, community licences last for one year only, which is a big discouragement for investors to put their work or funding into such a project. In South Africa community licences are issued for four years. The restrictions are further exacerbated by the fact that according to section 9(3) stations shall not transmit their own signals, nor are they allowed to own transmitters, masts, antennae etc. They have to send their signal to another company, which will then beam the signal on their behalf. This impinges on the potential broadcasters' and citizens' freedom to determine what type of information they want to broadcast or listen to.
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Comparisons may be drawn with South Africa and Malawi. 106 To its credit, the BSA makes no pretence that the licensing authority is independent. It has been stated that the licensing authority should be independent. A law creating a licensing authority susceptible to control and interference by the government falls foul of Section 20(1) of the Constitution. In the case of Zimbabwe, the licensing and regulatory authority is in a sense the government itself. There can be no suggestion therefore that the licensing and regulatory authority (the Minister of State for Information and Publicity in the President's office) is independent.
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In South Africa community broadcasting licences are valid for four (4) years, television broadcasting licences for eight years, radio broadcasting licences for six years, a common signal carrier licence for fifteen years and a signal carrier licence given to a commercial broadcaster for eight years. In granting the IBA its public interest mandate and powers, enunciated in sections 2, 28 and 78 of this Act, it proclaimed a new system of regulating broadcasting in South Africa. In addition it gave policy directives to various broadcasting policy areas, including; licensing and the creation of public, community, and commercial broadcasting sectors; South African television content and music; the broadcasting frequency plan; subscription and multichannel services; media and equity ownership rules; black economic empowerment; the promotion of media diversity; and marginalised languages. 
Electoral legislation

115
Electoral legislation in Zimbabwe is categorised as operational and institutional.
Institutional legislation provides for the creation of institutions that conduct elections.
Operational legislation provides for the modus operandi of elections in the country. The provisions give the Commission far-reaching powers over voter education. The Act also bars all foreign support for voter education activities except through the Electoral Commission. Under the Act, the Commission would be empowered to require anyone other than a political party providing voter education to furnish it with detailed information, including its funding sources.
128 Failure to comply with any one of these laws would constitute a criminal offence liable to a fine or to up to two years of imprisonment. Much of civil society and many NGOs depend on foreign funding.
Civil society has therefore tended to view the Electoral Act as government's attempt to flush them out of existence and to cause cash-flow problems for civic groups. A free election is one in which voters can freely vote for the candidates of their choice.
The electoral laws themselves must create a set of rules that allow all contesting parties to compete fairly in the elections and all eligible voters who wish to do so to The power to appoint persons to preside over a special court shall vest in the President, after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission: provided that Parliament may provide that the Chief Justice may, after consulting the Judicial Service Commission, appoint a person holding the office of Judge of the High Court to preside over a special court for such a period as he may specify.
Conclusion
Prior to the March 2008 elections, the Government of Zimbabwe had taken advantage of its mandate and parliamentary majority to enact laws that restrict and curtail citizens' participation in strengthening public policy. Amendments to existing laws had been vindictive and tended to dis-empower citizens from partaking in matters of public interest. The employment of laws to repress the citizenry has seen the government breaching and reneging on its obligations to serve the populace.
However, recent development where the opposition has assumed a parliamentary majority have created a tense situation where the establishment does not want to relinquish power, with talk of a government of national unity becoming prevalent in political circles. Generally, the behaviour of the ZANU (PF) regime has been a slap in the face of democracy and all democratic and proactive forces. The results of the run-off elections have indicated that the ruling party has the audacity and capability to manipulate the electoral process for its advantage. The only problem that ZANU (PF) will have with its "electoral victory" is the recognition of its Presidency by prodemocratic forces in Zimbabwe, civil society and the regional and international 
